

Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP-0117

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Table of Contents

[1 Introduction 4](#_Toc165026365)

[1.1 Overview 4](#_Toc165026366)

[1.2 Scope 4](#_Toc165026367)

[1.3 Definitions 4](#_Toc165026368)

[1.4 Abbreviations 5](#_Toc165026369)

[1.5 References 5](#_Toc165026370)

[1.6 Conventions 6](#_Toc165026371)

[2 Certification Process 6](#_Toc165026372)

[2.1 Security Certification for the Integrated eUICC 6](#_Toc165026373)

[2.2 Integrated TRE certification 7](#_Toc165026374)

[2.2.1 Security Target Augmentation 7](#_Toc165026375)

[2.2.2 Certification Report 7](#_Toc165026376)

[2.2.3 Checklist to Support Compliance Verification 8](#_Toc165026377)

[2.3 Integrated eUICC Composite Certification 8](#_Toc165026378)

[Annex A Integrated eUICC Checklist (Informative) 9](#_Toc165026379)

[Annex B Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative) 9](#_Toc165026380)

[Annex C Document Management 10](#_Toc165026381)

[C.1 Document History 10](#_Toc165026382)

[C.2 Other Information 10](#_Toc165026383)

# Introduction

## Overview

The Integrated eUICC consists of:

* An Integrated TRE:  hardware sub-system within a System-on-Chip (SoC) and its low-level kernel and software services
* The eUICC OS software: executed inside the Integrated TRE hardware, is stored securely in TRE internal memories and/or in remote memories, typically the hosting device Non Volatile Memory and/or RAM.

The Integrated TRE consists of three parts:

1. A kernel managing TRE hardware security functions.
2. The services for communication, application management, and memory management.
3. The hardware platform.

All the above mentioned parts of the Integrated eUICC have been taken into consideration in order to develop, in this document, the creation of the security certification framework for the Integrated eUICC.

## Scope

This document describes the certification methodology for Integrated eUICC based on the Protection Profile PP-0117 [6] developed by Eurosmart and certified by BSI.

The certification methodology for Integrated eUICC based on the Protection Profile PP-0084 [18] is defined by SGP.08 [19].

This document covers the security certification framework for the Integrated eUICC and the process that SHALL be followed to perform the security evaluation of the Integrated eUICC that have been designed referencing GSMA PRD SGP.01 [1] and SGP.21 [9]. The associated Protection Profiles are described in GSMA PRD SGP.05 [2], and SGP.25 [10].

Integrated eUICCs assessed under these procedures are expected to be able to declare compliance to the eUICC security assurance requirements of the GSMA M2M and RSP compliance processes, respectively SGP.16 [3] and SGP.24 [11].

## Definitions

| Term  | Description |
| --- | --- |
| Certification Report | Evaluation Report issued by the Certification Body to attest the certification. |
| eUICC | A removable or non-removable UICC which enables the remote and/or local management of Profiles in a secure way.NOTE: The term originates from "embedded UICC". |
| Integrated eUICC  | An eUICC implemented on a Tamper Resistant Element (TRE) that is integrated into a System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally making use of remote volatile/non-volatile memory (as per SGP.01/SGP.21). |
| Integrated TRE  | A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC)  |
| GSMA Certification Body | Certification Body role, appointed by GSMA   |
| Protection Profile | Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type (as per the Common Criteria methodology). |
| Security Target | Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE (as per the Common Criteria methodology). |
| Tamper Resistant Element  | A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, capable of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and their confidential and cryptographic data (as per SGP.01/SGP.21). |

## Abbreviations

| Term  | Description |
| --- | --- |
| eSA | GSMA eUICC Security Assurance |
| CB | Certification Body |
| IC | Integrated Circuit |
| ITSEF | Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility |
| NVM | Non Volatile Memory  |
| OS | Operating System |
| RAM | Random Access Memory |
| RMPF | Remote Memory Protection Function  |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SoC | System-on-Chip |
| SOG-IS | Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TRE  | Tamper Resistant Element  |
| 3S | Secure Subsystem in SoC |

## References

| Ref | Doc Number | Title |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1.
 | SGP.01  | Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture  |
|  | SGP.05  | Embedded UICC Protection Profile |
|  | SGP.16  | M2M Compliance Process |
|  | GSMA PRD AA.35 | Procedures for Industry Specifications |
|  | RFC2119 |  “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” S. Bradner <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt> |
|  | PP-0117 | Secure Sub-System in System-on-Chip (3S in SoC) Protection Profile, Version:* v1.5  - BSI-CC-PP-0117-2022
* v1.8 – BSI-CC-PP-0117-v2-2023

References to *[6]* in this PP may be interpreted as *any of the two versions of this document*.  References to *[6] version 1.8 (BSI-CC-PP-0117-v2-2023) shall be interpreted as only the version 1.8 (BSI-CC-PP-0117-v2-2023) of the document.*   |
|  | PP-0089 | BSI-CC-PP-0089-2015Embedded UICC Protection Profile Version 1.1 / 25.08.2015, certified by Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) |
|  | JIL-CCCE | Joint Interpretation LibraryComposite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devicesVersion 1.5.1 May 2018 |
|  | SGP.21  | RSP Architecture  |
|  | SGP.25  | GSMA Embedded UICC for Consumer Devices Protection Profile |
|  | SGP.24  | RSP Compliance Process  |
|  | PP-0100  | BSI-CC-PP-0100-2018  |
|  | NIST SP 800-108 | Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions  |
|  | BSI TR-02102-1 | Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths  |
|  | ANSSI RGS v2 B1 | Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1 |
|  | NIST SP 800-175B | Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms  |
|  | NIST SP 800-53r4 | Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 |
|  | PP-0084 | BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, Eurosmart 2014, certified by Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)  |
|  | SGP.08 | Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP-0084 |

## Conventions

 “The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [5].”

# Certification Process

## Security Certification for the Integrated eUICC

In order to achieve the security certification of an Integrated eUICC, the process described in the following steps SHALL be executed:

1. Security certification of the Integrated TRE SHALL be obtained with a SOG-IS CB in the domain of ‘*smartcard and similar devices*’ according to PP-0117 [6] and a Security Target with the additional security requirements defined in Annex B.

2. Composite certification of the Integrated eUICC SHALL be done:

* Based on the Integrated TRE certified with the SOG-IS CB, and
* According to either:
	+ PP-0089 [7] or SGP.05 [2] using the assurance schemes authorised in SGP.16 [3]
	+ PP-0100 [12] or SGP.25 [10] using the assurance schemes authorised in SGP.24 [11]

The validation of the Integrated eUICC integration into the device is out of the scope of this document.

## Integrated TRE certification

### Security Target Augmentation

The Integrated TRE Security Target SHALL claim compliance to the BSI-CC-PP-0117-2022 [6] and the additional security requirements defined in  Annex B.



1. Security Target for the Integrated eUICC TRE

### Certification Report

The Certification Report SHALL attest that the evaluation of the integrated eUICC has been performed in compliance to the BSI-CC-PP-0117-2022 [6] .

### Checklist to Support Compliance Verification

The SoC maker SHALL produce a checklist, as detailed in Annex A, that provides evidence that all requirements from Annex B have been taken into account during the definition of the Security Target.

This checklist SHALL be used during the Integrated eUICC security evaluation.

## Integrated eUICC Composite Certification

The Integrated eUICC Security Target SHALL comply with the security objectives and requirements as defined in the Protection Profile SGP.05 [2] or SGP.25 [10].

The evaluation of the eUICC running on the Integrated TRE SHALL be handled through the Composite Evaluation framework (see JIL-CCCE [8]).

1. Integrated eUICC Checklist (Informative)

The mandatory fields are Requirement from Annex B and “Covered”. The Field “Security Target” is mandatory when the Security Target is public.

NOTE: The Security Target column needs to be filled with the reference of the Security Target Objective / Requirement or a rationale explaining why this requirement was considered out of scope.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Requirement** | **Description** | **Covered (Yes/No)** | **Security Target (see Note)** | **Comments** |
| **Example:** **SEC1** | **Example:** *TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the TRE..*   |  |  |  |

1. Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)

| Req no. | Description |
| --- | --- |
| **Cryptographic Keys Requirements** |
| **SEC1**  | TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the TRE. |
| **SEC2**  | The entropy of the TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be at least 256 bits. |
| **SEC3**  | Randomly generated keys used by the RMPF SHALL be at least 256 bits.  |
| **SEC4**  | The key derivation mechanism used by the RMPF SHALL be compliant with NIST SP 800-108 [13] and SHALL use:* a block cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than AES-256, or
* a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256,
 |
| **Confidentiality Requirements** |
| **SEC5** | The RMPF SHALL provide confidentiality based on encryption using a cipher with security strength equivalent to, or greater than AES-256 and using a suitable mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [16] [17] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [14] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [15]. |
| **Integrity and Authenticity** |
| **SEC6** | The RMPF SHALL use a cryptographic integrity mechanism with security strength equivalent to, or greater than SHA-256. |
| **SEC7** | The RMPF SHALL provide authentication using a MAC of at least 128 bits based * on a block cipher using a cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than AES-256, or
* on a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256,

and using a mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [16] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [14] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [15]. |
| **SEC8**  | [SEC5](#SEC5) and [SEC7](#SEC7) MAY also be provided in combination by an authenticated encryption mode fulfilling both requirements. |

1. Document Management
	1. Document History

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Version | Date | Brief Description of Change | Approval Authority | Editor / Company |
| V1.0 | 19/09/2022 | CR0001R01 – SGP.18 v1.0 Adoption of PP-0117 (3S PP) | ISAG | Gloria Trujillo, GSMA |
| V1.0.1 | 02/01/2024 | Correction of broken references and minor editorials | eSIMWG5 | Gloria Trujillo, GSMA |
| V1.1 | 04/06/2024 | CR0002R02 - Update of PP0117 reference | eSIMWG5 | Gloria Trujillo, GSMA |

* 1. Other Information

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Type | Description |
| Document Owner | eSIMWG  |
| Editor / Company | Gloria Trujillo, GSMA  |

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